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IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT?: 
CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP V. 
TROICE AND THE APPLICABILITY 
OF THE SECURITIES LITIGATION 
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT 
JOHN W. MESSICK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the “financial empire” of Allen Stanford became insolvent 
and the SEC revealed that Stanford International Bank (SIB) and 
other investment entities Stanford operated were part of a multi-
billion dollar Ponzi scheme.1 Stanford fraudulently induced investors 
into purchasing certificates of deposit (CDs) by promising high rates 
of return and misrepresenting that the CDs were backed by safe, 
liquid securities.2 When the fraud finally collapsed, it cost investors 
billions of dollars. Investors subsequently filed a class action under 
state law against the law firm of Chadbourne & Parke LLP, which 
allegedly assisted Stanford in perpetuating the fraud.3 
However, the state law class action is threatened by the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which precludes state 
law class actions brought “in connection with” the purchase or sale of 
covered securities.4 In Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice,5 the 
Supreme Court will decide whether SLUSA applies here because SIB 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  See Joint Appendix, Vol. II at 427, 434, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-
79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. May 3, 2013).   
 2.  See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 3.  Brief for Troice Respondents in Opposition at 3, 6–7, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. 
Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents]. The 
Supreme Court is hearing this case alongside an appeal involving another state law class action 
against the law firm Proskauer Rose LLP, also alleged to have assisted Stanford in his Ponzi 
scheme, as well as a related appeal involving SIB’s insurance brokers. See infra note 16. 
 4.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)–(2) (West 2013). 
 5.  Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2013). 
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marketed the CDs by misrepresenting that they were backed by 
securities. If the Court finds that the misrepresentations were not “in 
connection with” the purchase or sale of securities, the state law class 
action will stand. However, if the “in connection with” requirement is 
met, then SLUSA preempts the state law class action, and the 
complaint must be dismissed. 
Chadbourne presents the Court with the opportunity to clarify the 
meaning of “in connection with”—a phrase lower courts have 
struggled to interpret consistently.6 Because SIB only misrepresented 
its holdings in securities—not its transactions in them—the Court will 
likely rule that SLUSA is inapplicable, and thus that investors may 
proceed with their class action in state court against Chadbourne & 
Parke.  
II.  FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner is the law firm of Chadbourne & Parke LLP, which 
is alleged to have aided and abetted SIB in its fraudulent investment 
scheme by helping SIB avoid regulatory oversight.7 Since the late 
1980s, R. Allen Stanford operated a vast financial services “empire,” 
consisting of numerous financial entities in the United States and 
overseas.8 One such entity was the Antigua-based SIB, whose primary 
business was marketing and selling CDs, of which it had sold $7.2 
billion by 2009.9 The reality, however, was that several Stanford 
entities were nothing more than a front for a global Ponzi scheme, 
whereby SIB used the proceeds from sales of CDs to pay interest on 
existing CDs.10 In order to avoid regulatory oversight from the United 
States and other countries, in 2005 Stanford hired Tom Sjoblom, who 
was then a partner at Chadbourne & Parke.11 Among other things, 
Sjoblom sent a letter to the SEC arguing that the SEC lacked 
regulatory oversight of SIB’s operations, a statement he allegedly 
knew to be false.12 
 
 6.  See John M. Wunderlich, “Uniform” Standards for Securities Class Actions, 80 TENN. 
L. REV. 167, 209 (2012) (discussing the widely divergent outcomes in circuit courts’ rulings 
regarding SLUSA). 
 7.  See Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 1, at 455. 
 8.  See id. at 427–28. 
 9.  See id. at 430. 
 10.  See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 11.  See Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 1, at 455. 
 12.  See id. at 457. In a letter to the SEC, Sjoblom cited case law holding that the SEC did 
not have regulatory authority over CDs issued by foreign banks when the government of that 
foreign country provided sufficient regulatory oversight, which Sjoblom claimed was the case in 
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Eventually the fraud collapsed, causing thousands of investors to 
lose their savings.13 In addition to a suit by the SEC, two groups of 
Louisiana residents (the Roland plaintiffs) brought suit in state courts 
against various individuals and entities operated by Stanford for 
making fraudulent representations about the quality of the CDs.14 
Similarly, two separate complaints were brought under Texas law in 
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas by the 
Respondents here (the Troice plaintiffs).15 The first complaint named 
SIB’s insurance brokers as defendants; the second named the law 
firms that assisted SIB in evading regulatory oversight as defendants.16 
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases 
to the Northern District of Texas, which chose one case, Roland v. 
Green, to test the applicability of SLUSA.17 The district court 
dismissed the case because it found SIB’s investment scheme 
depended upon the assurance that the investments were backed by 
securities, and thus the class action was precluded under SLUSA.18 
The Roland and Troice plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit, 
challenging the district court’s dismissal.19 
 
 
 
 
 
Antigua. Id. 
 13.  See Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 4. 
 14.  See id. at 4–5. The defendants named in the Roland plaintiffs’ complaint did not appeal 
the court decision against them, and thus any issues specific to their case are not before the 
Supreme Court. 
 15.  See id. at 6. 
 16.  See id. at 6–7. In addition to Chadbourne & Parke, the Petitioners, the complaint also 
named the law firm of Proskauer Rose LLP as a defendant. These complaints both arise out of 
the actions of the same partner, Sjoblom, who left Chadbourne to become a partner at 
Proskauer, where he allegedly continued to assist SIB in evading regulation. See Joint Appendix 
Vol. II, supra note 1, at 487–88. Proskauer appealed an adverse Fifth Circuit decision and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case as a consolidated matter with the case 
discussed here. See Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2013).  
 17.  See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 509–10 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, sub nom 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 511. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. PSLRA, SLUSA, and Supreme Court Precedent 
Chardbourne concerns the meaning of the phrase “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a covered security”20 in determining 
SLUSA’s preclusive scope.21 This language is derived from Rule 10b-5, 
which was promulgated in 1942 under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act.22 Rule 10b-5 “broadly prohibits deception, 
misrepresentation, and fraud ‘in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security.’”23 Although enforcement of the statute is explicitly 
granted to the SEC, the Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized 
an implied private right of action.24 In order to limit vexatious 
securities litigation while maintaining a cause of action for deserving 
plaintiffs, the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores25 
limited recovery under Rule 10b-5 litigation to parties who actually 
purchased or sold securities.26 Thus, “holders” of securities—those who 
are fraudulently induced into waiting to purchase or sell a security—
cannot bring claims under Rule 10b-5.27 
Similarly, in enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) in 1995, Congress was also motivated by the need to 
balance providing remedies for deserving plaintiffs with preventing 
onerous lawsuits.28 This legislation, which implemented various 
limitations29 on covered class actions involving covered securities,30 
unintentionally caused an influx of class action securities fraud claims 
in state court by virtue of making state law more attractive to 
 
 20.  A “covered security” is one that is traditionally listed on a national exchange. See 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006). 
 21.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (West 2013).  
       22.    Dabit, 547 U.S. at 78. 
 23.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014). 
 24.  Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971). 
 25.  421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 26.  Dabit, 547 U.S. at 80–81. 
 27.  See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754–55 (holding that plaintiffs could not bring suit 
because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities). The Blue Chip Stamps Court 
emphasized that suits brought by holders of securities were especially prone to abuse. See Dabit, 
547 U.S. at 71 (discussing Blue Chip Stamps). 
 28.  Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81. 
       29.    Specifically, PSLRA provided for limits on damages and attorney’s fees, sanctions for 
frivolous litigation, a stay of discovery following a motion to dismiss, restrictions on lead 
plaintiffs, and a safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u–4 
(West 2013). 
 30.  A “covered class action” is one in which damages are being sought by fifty or more 
individuals. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 83. 
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plaintiffs than federal law.31 Thus, to maintain “the congressional 
preference for [having] national standards for securities class action 
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities,”32 and to prevent any 
one state from unduly burdening the market for nationally traded 
securities,33 Congress passed SLUSA in 1998.34 
The “core provision”35 of the SLUSA provides: 
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law 
of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State 
or Federal court by any private party alleging . . . a 
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a covered security; or . . . that the defendant 
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security.36 
Covered class actions brought under state law that meet the 
requirements of SLUSA are removed to federal court, where they are 
subject to dismissal.37 However, SLUSA does not actually prevent a 
plaintiff from asserting any cause of action under state law; “[i]t 
simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to 
vindicate certain claims.”38 
 
 
 31.  See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3 (1998) (commenting that after the passage of PSLRA, 
“there appear[ed] to be a ‘substitution effect’ whereby plaintiff's counsel file[d] state court 
complaints when the underlying facts appear[d] not to satisfy new, more stringent federal 
pleading requirements, or otherwise [sought] to avoid the substantive or procedural provisions 
of [PSLRA]”); see also Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 303 (1998) (discussing empirical studies 
of class action fraud claims after PSLRA and noting “[t]he relative stability in overall filing 
activity masked a significant shift in litigation from federal to state court”). 
 32.  Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87. 
 33.  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 5 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that “a single state can 
impose the risks and costs of its pecular [sic] litigation system on all national issuers [of 
securities]”). 
 34.  Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82. 
 35.  Id. at 83. 
 36.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2013). 
 37.  See id. § 78bb(f)(2). 
 38.  Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87. Although SLUSA does not deny any individual plaintiff the right 
to assert any cause of action under state law, in many instances a class action is the only 
economically viable means by which plaintiffs may pursue a fraud claim. See Wunderlich, supra 
note 6, at 171 (2012) (discussing how plaintiffs who have suffered relatively small losses 
individually can bear the cost of expensive securities fraud litigation by aggregating their claims 
in a class action suit). 
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B. Dabit and the Meaning of “In Connection With” Under SLUSA 
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,39 the 
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase “in connection 
with” in SLUSA for the first time.40 In Dabit, former Merrill Lynch 
brokers alleged that the investment bank had breached its fiduciary 
duty and covenant of good faith by providing the brokers with 
misleading research about the stocks held by their clients.41 Managers 
at the bank supposedly instructed analysts to issue overly optimistic 
reports of the stocks’ outlook; the brokers in turn told their own 
clients to hold the shares longer than the clients would have without 
these reports.42 When the prices of these stocks eventually fell, clients 
left the bank, causing the brokers to lose commission fees.43 The 
brokers filed a class action against Merrill Lynch under Oklahoma 
law; Merrill Lynch responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that SLUSA precluded the class action.44 
The Supreme Court overruled a Second Circuit holding that fraud 
is only “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security if actual 
purchasers or sellers allege they were injured by the fraud.45 The 
Court highlighted that it had previously held, regarding the phrase “in 
connection with” under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, that it was enough 
that a fraud “coincide” with a securities transaction, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff was party to that transaction.46 Finding that 
Congress must have been aware of how both the Court and the SEC 
had been interpreting “in connection with” in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
when enacting SLUSA, the Court reasoned that Congress must have 
intended the phrase to have the same meaning there as it did in § 
 
 39.  547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
      40.     Id. at 71. 
 41.  Id. at 75. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 76. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See id. at 76–77. Thus, under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, because holders of 
securities (rather than purchasers or sellers) were alleging injury, SLUSA did not apply. Id. The 
Second Circuit reached its decision by adopting the purchaser-seller requirement from Blue 
Chip Stamps. See id. However, in overturning the ruling of the Second Circuit, the Supreme 
Court found that Blue Chip Stamps addressed the private scope of action under § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, not the meaning of “in connection with,” which the Court viewed as a separate 
concept. See id. at 81.   
 46.  See id. at 85 (“The requisite showing . . . is deception ‘in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.” (quoting United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997))).  
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5.47 In addition, considering the policy 
considerations underlying SLUSA,48 and noting “[t]he magnitude of 
the federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficient operation 
of the market for nationally traded securities,”49 the Court ruled that 
“in connection with” should be interpreted broadly.50 Thus, under 
SLUSA, “it is enough that the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a 
securities transaction,” to preclude a state law class action.51 In other 
words, to invoke SLUSA preclusion, it is not necessary to show that 
an “identifiable purchaser or seller” of securities was deceived; 
instead, one must only show “deception in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.”52 
C. Lower Courts Struggle to Interpret Dabit 
Courts have had difficulty in assigning a precise meaning to “in 
connection with,” and as a result many circuit courts have crafted 
their own language to describe the requirement.53 For example, in 
Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch (IPM),54 a group of 
investors alleged that a pension fund had misappropriated their 
investments for personal use.55 The investors claimed that Merrill 
Lynch was liable for their loss under Florida law because the 
investment bank had permitted the fund to hold itself out as Merrill 
Lynch’s business partner, and because the investment bank had failed 
to prevent the fund from misappropriating money from the investors’ 
accounts.56 Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss, arguing that SLUSA 
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims.57 The Second Circuit held that the 
“coincide” requirement was met if the plaintiffs were induced into 
investing with the defendants because the plaintiffs believed they 
were investing in covered securities, or if the “fraudulent scheme . . . 
 
 47.  See id. (“Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad construction adopted by 
both this Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrase—‘in connection with the purchase 
or sale’—into SLUSA’s core provision.”). 
 48.  See id. at 86 (discussing how a narrow interpretation of the phrase would be contrary 
to SLUSA’s purpose). 
 49.  Id. at 78. 
 50.  Id. at 85–86. 
 51.  Id. at 85 (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651).  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See Wunderlich, supra note 6, at 209 (discussing the widely divergent outcomes in 
circuit court rulings regarding SLUSA). 
 54.  546 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 55.  Id. at 1342. 
 56.  Id. at 1342–43. 
 57.  Id. at 1344. 
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coincided with and depended upon the purchase or sale of [covered] 
securities.”58 The court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that 
the defendant’s fraud had induced them to invest with the pension 
fund. Because of this, the court ruled that their claims were “in 
connection with the purchase or sale” of securities, and so SLUSA 
applied.59 
The Ninth Circuit took a slightly different approach in Madden v. 
Cowen & Co.60 In Madden, the plaintiffs, former shareholders of a 
closely-held corporation, filed a class action against an investment 
bank that advised them to sell their company to a publicly traded 
corporation in exchange for shares of the publicly traded 
corporation.61 When the publicly traded corporation’s stock price 
plummeted a few months later, it greatly diminished the value of the 
shares the plaintiffs had received. The plaintiffs filed suit against the 
investment bank for professional negligence under California law.62 
Finding that a fraud is “in connection with” covered securities if the 
“fraud and stock sale coincide or are more than tangentially related,” 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that SLUSA precluded the plaintiffs’ action 
because Cowen’s investment advice met this standard.63 
Adding an additional layer of complexity, lower courts have taken 
different approaches to determine whether a class action is precluded 
under SLUSA when there is a disconnect between the fraudulent 
representations made to the plaintiffs and the actual purchase or sale 
of covered securities.64 In these “feeder fund” cases, the defendant 
fraudulently induces the investors to purchase some type of 
uncovered financial product, which is related in some way to 
 
 58.  Id. at 1349. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 61.  Id. at 962. 
 62.  Id. at 962–63. 
 63.  Id. at 966 (quoting Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002)). In 
addition to the Second and Ninth Circuits, several other circuit courts have addressed the 
meaning of “coincides with,” each creating a slightly different test. See e.g. Romano v. Kazacos, 
609 F.3d 512, 522 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding “coincide” to mean “necessarily allege,” “necessarily 
involve,” or “rest on” the purchase or sale of covered securities); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
526 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008) (interpreting “coincide” as meaning “related to” the 
purchase or sale of covered securities); Gavin v. AT&T Corp., 464 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(defining “coincide” to mean “‘involving nationally traded securities’” (quoting Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006))). 
 64.  Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 514 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Chadbourne 
& Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013). 
MESSICK 1.28.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2014  1:36 PM 
2013] IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT? 133 
transactions involving covered securities.65 The most common method 
of analyzing fraudulent schemes structured as feeder funds is the 
“purpose approach,” which considers the purpose of the fraudulent 
investment scheme.66 Under this analysis, a court must decide if “the 
uncovered securities (feeder funds) ‘were created for the purpose of 
investing in [covered] securities.’”67 If the fraud “inevitably included 
the purchase and sale of covered securities,” then SLUSA applies.68 
However, there is no categorical rule for analyzing cases under the 
purpose approach.69 Some courts have looked to whether the purpose 
of the fund itself was to invest in covered securities,70 while others 
have examined the purpose of the relationship between the investor 
and the defendant.71 
Despite the different meanings courts have assigned to “in 
connection with” and the different approaches they have taken to 
analyzing feeder fund cases, there is one point on which they have 
been largely in agreement: that the economic realities of the 
investment scheme determine whether SLUSA is triggered, 
regardless of how the fraud is described in the pleadings.72 
 
 65.  See id. at 516–17. 
 66.  See id. Other approaches include the “product approach,” which simply looks at 
whether the product that was purchased was a covered security, and the “separation approach,” 
which considers the degree of separation between the business entities that separate the fraud 
and the securities transaction. See id. at 514–15. 
 67.  See id. at 517 (quoting Newman v. Family Mgmt. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 299, 312 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 68.  See id. (quoting In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 386, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 69.  The purpose approach cases described in Roland do not adopt the term “purpose 
approach.” Rather, the phrase was coined by the Fifth Circuit to describe a general trend in the 
analysis of multilayered investment schemes. See id. 
 70.  See, e.g., Newman, 748 F. Supp. at 312 (noting that misrepresentations about non-
covered interests in a partnership may still be “in connection with” covered securities under 
SLUSA if the partnership was created for the purpose of investing in covered securities); 
Beacon Assocs., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 430. 
 71.  See, e.g., Rowinski v. Saloman Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he action arises from the broker/investor relationship, the ‘very purpose’ of which is 
‘trading in securities.’” (quoting Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d 
Cir. 1985))); Levinson v. PSCC Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00269 (PCD), 2009 WL 5184363, at *11 
(D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009) (noting that the agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants “was 
formed for the purpose of investing Plaintiffs’ funds in securities”); Backus v. Conn. Cmty. 
Bank, N.A., No. 3:09-CV-1256, 2009 WL 5184360, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (“The . . . 
agreement governing the parties' dealings states that the relationship was created for the 
purpose of investment in securities[.]”). 
 72.  See Wunderlich, supra note 6, at 184 (noting that “federal courts have unanimously 
said that the substance, not the form, of the complaint controls for purposes of SLUSA 
preclusion”). 
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IV. HOLDING 
Reversing the decision of the district court, the Fifth Circuit found 
that the misrepresentations made by SIB and Chadbourne & Parke 
were not “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security” 
because they were “not more than tangentially related” to those 
transactions. Therefore, SLUSA did not apply and the state law class 
action against Chadbourne & Parke could proceed.73 In determining 
that “‘not more than tangentially related’ to covered securities” was 
the standard by which the investors’ complaints should be evaluated, 
the court first considered whether a plaintiff or defendant-oriented 
analysis was more appropriate for determining whether SLUSA 
applied.74 Under a plaintiff-oriented test, SLUSA applies if the 
plaintiffs were “induced” into investing in non-covered securities 
because they “thought they were investing in covered securities or 
invested because of (representations about) covered securities.”75 A 
defendant-oriented test, on the other hand, looks to whether the 
defendants’ scheme “coincided and depended upon” transactions 
involving covered securities by examining “whether the defendants’ 
fraudulent scheme would have been successful without the 
(representations about) securities.”76  
The court decided that the plaintiff-oriented inquiry’s 
“inducement” requirement was misguided because it “import[ed] 
causation into a test [from Dabit] whose language (“coincide”) 
specifically disclaim[ed]” causation.77 Because of this, the defendant-
oriented analysis was more faithful to the Supreme Court’s “coincides 
with” requirement.78 However, the court reasoned that the defendant-
oriented “depended upon” language created too stringent a standard, 
and that “more than tangentially related” was the best formulation of 
the requirement.79 The Fifth Circuit found that this test best accounted 
 
 73.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 523–24. 
 74.  Id. at 518–19. Although Chadbourne & Parke are the named defendants, SLUSA 
preclusion turns on whether SIB’s misrepresentations to the investors were “in connection with” 
the purchase or sale of a covered security. Thus, the defendant-oriented test must view the 
situation from SIB’s perspective.  
 75.  Id. at 519 (quoting Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349 
(11th Cir. 2008)). 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. (“The defendant-oriented perspective . . . is more faithful to the Court's 
statement that ‘[t]he requisite showing . . . is deception in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security, not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.’” (quoting Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006))). 
 79.  Id. at 520 (quoting Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 996 (9th Cir. 2009)). The 
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for the Supreme Court’s instruction that “in connection with” not be 
construed so broadly that SLUSA precludes every common law 
action for fraud brought under state law.80 
Because SIB’s fraud had been a multi-layered feeder fund, it was 
necessary for the court to examine the “actualities of the alleged 
schemes.”81 Although SIB had claimed that the CDs were attractive 
investments because they were backed by covered securities, this was 
one of many misrepresentations made to the investors designed to 
inveigle them into purchasing the CDs.82 Assuming the perspective of 
SIB, misrepresentations about covered securities were “merely 
tangentially related” to the fraudulent scheme, and the “heart, crux, 
and gravamen” of the scheme was that the CDs were a superior 
investment for a multitude of reasons, not just because they were 
backed by covered securities.83 As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the fraudulent schemes of SIB were “not more than tangentially 
related to the purchase or sale of covered securities” and therefore 
did not trigger SLUSA preclusion.84 
Finally, the court noted that the allegations against the law firm 
defendants, including Chadbourne & Parke, were different because 
the investors did not claim that the law firms made any 
misrepresentations to them.85 Rather, the law firms allegedly aided 
and abetted SIB’s fraud by misrepresenting the SEC’s ability to 
regulate SIB, and had these misrepresentations not been made, the 
harm to plaintiffs would not have occurred.86 Nonetheless, the court 
found that the misrepresentations were “not more than tangentially 
related to the purchase or sale of covered securities,” and so SLUSA 
was not triggered.87 Chadbourne & Parke appealed and the Supreme 
 
court found that “depended upon” was too high of a requirement for SLUSA to apply because 
other circuits had generally relied on less restrictive standards in formulating their own tests. See 
id. (“The Sixth Circuit . . . seemed to suggest that while a claim that ‘depended on’ a securities 
transaction was sufficient, there were other connections that would also meet the ‘coincide’ 
requirement.”). 
 80.  Id. (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)). 
 81.  Id. at 521. 
 82.  Id. at 522. 
 83.  See id. These other reasons included that the investments would yield a higher rate of 
return, were more liquid than other investments, and were subject to regulatory oversight. 
 84.  See id.  
 85.  See id. at 523. 
 86.  See id. at 523–24. 
 87.  Id. at 524. 
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Court granted certiorari.88 
V.  ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Argument 
Chadbourne & Parke first contends that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court precedent, the “in connection with” requirement must be 
construed broadly, both in SLUSA and in § 10(b).89 Although a 
narrow reading of that requirement is textually possible, the Court 
rejected such a reading in Dabit.90 Furthermore, a broad reading of “in 
connection with” in SLUSA is supported by Congress’s policy 
objective: to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing PSLRA by filing 
securities class actions in state court.91 However, even if the “in 
connection with” requirement is read narrowly, Respondents’ 
complaint meets this requirement because SIB misrepresented that 
the CDs were a safe and liquid investment, backed by a portfolio of 
covered securities, when in fact they were not.92 That the 
misrepresentations concerning covered securities were made at a 
different time from any of SIB’s transactions in securities is irrelevant, 
because the misstatements and transactions were part of a common 
fraudulent scheme.93 
Chadbourne & Parke next argues that the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
is flawed for three reasons. First, Chadbourne & Parke claims that, 
contrary to the lower court’s ruling, SIB’s misrepresentations were 
crucial to the fraudulent scheme.94 Only misrepresentations about 
covered securities could answer investors’ questions about how SIB 
was able to promise high rates of return on safe, liquid investments, 
and these characteristics were the most important factor in marketing 
the CDs to SIB’s investors.95 Second, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that 
 
      88.    Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at i, No. 12-79 (U.S. July 18, 2012). 
 89.  Brief for Petitioner at 27, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79 (U.S. May 3, 
2013). 
 90.  Id. at 24–45 (“[T]his Court has long rejected that narrow interpretation of § 10(b)’s ‘in 
connection with’ language. Instead, ‘when this Court has sought to give meaning to th[at] phrase 
in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it has espoused a broad interpretation.’” (quoting 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006))). 
 91.  Id. at 25–26. 
 92.  Id. at 28–30. 
 93.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79 (U.S. 
Aug. 18, 2013). 
 94.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 34–35. 
 95.  Id. at 35–36. 
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SLUSA preclusion does not apply because SIB’s misrepresentations 
concerning covered securities were “but one of a host of 
(mis)representations” is not textually supported by SLUSA.96 By the 
terms of the statute, if a complaint alleges “a misrepresentation” in 
connection with covered securities, SLUSA applies, and it is irrelevant 
whether the defendants made misrepresentations about things other 
than covered securities.97 Under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, 
Chadbourne & Parke claims, plaintiffs could avoid SLUSA 
preemption by adding allegations of fraud unrelated to covered 
securities to their complaints, so that the fraud actually involving 
covered securities was only one of several misrepresentations.98 This 
would undermine the purpose of SLUSA, which was to ensure that 
plaintiffs do not side-step PSLRA by bringing class actions in 
connection with covered securities in state court.99 Finally, 
Chadbourne & Parke argues that the Fifth Circuit’s test of 
determining the “heart,” “crux,” or “gravamen” of a fraud to decide if 
SLUSA applies is overly subjective, and courts will struggle to apply 
it.100 
B. Respondents’ Argument 
Respondents first argue that the complaints do not allege any 
material misrepresentation concerning covered securities. The CDs 
were not covered securities, nor were their returns tied in any way to 
the performance of covered securities. Therefore, their sale did not 
convey any ownership interest in covered securities.101 Furthermore, 
Respondents do not allege that Chadbourne & Parke made any 
representations to them directly, but rather that Chadbourne & Parke 
misrepresented to the SEC that SIB was not subject to regulation.102 
Next, Respondents reject Chadbourne & Parke’s argument that 
because SIB claimed it owned a portfolio of liquid assets, SLUSA was 
triggered.103 First, because SIB was a foreign bank and claimed its 
portfolio contained “highly marketable securities issued by stable 
national governments, strong multinational companies, and major 
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2006)) (emphasis added). 
 98.  Id. at 38. 
 99.  Id. at 36. 
 100.  Id. at 40. 
 101.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 18. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 21. 
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international banks,” there was no reason for individual investors to 
believe that their individual investments would lead SIB to purchase 
securities traded on American exchanges.104 Second, Respondents 
argue that even if SIB had explicitly stated it owned covered 
securities, the “in connection with” requirement of SLUSA would not 
be satisfied.105 Such a claim would merely relate to the ownership of 
securities and would not coincide with any actual transaction; thus it 
would not be “in connection with” the “purchase or sale” of any 
securities.106 This construction makes sense in light of Congress’s goal 
in enacting § 10(b), which was not to punish all deceptive conduct, but 
rather to regulate only certain transactions in national securities 
markets. SIB’s misrepresentations did not introduce dishonesty into 
national securities markets, and thus did not interfere with the 
congressional purpose behind the legislation.107 
Respondents finally argue that SLUSA does not encompass a 
situation in which defendants fraudulently induce plaintiffs to 
purchase CDs by falsely promising to purchase covered securities 
with the proceeds of the CDs.108 Respondents claim that Chadbourne 
& Parke advances an unprecedented construction of the “in 
connection with” requirement, one that would greatly broaden the 
preclusive effects of SLUSA.109 Noting that the Court warned against 
reading “in connection with” too broadly,110 Respondents assert that 
the construction Chadbourne & Parke advocates limits state law class 
actions at the same time as expanding the ability of the federal 
government and private citizens to bring suits under Rule 10b-5.111 
This would undermine Congress’s goal of limiting class actions 
involving nationally traded securities while simultaneously respecting 
state authority to regulate non-national securities.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 104.  Id. at 21–22. 
 105.  Id. at 22. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 26 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)). 
 108.  Id. at 30–31. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 41 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)). 
 111.  Id. at 43. 
 112.  Id. at 43–45. 
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VI.  ANALYSIS 
Chadbourne and the related cases before the Court present an 
opportunity for the Court to not only further elucidate the “coincides 
with” requirement set forth in Dabit, but also to address the 
applicability of SLUSA in cases involving complex feeder fund 
investment schemes, such as the one at hand (or those operated by 
Bernie Madoff).113 Although Dabit clarified that SLUSA preclusion 
extends to holders of securities, lower courts nonetheless have 
struggled to define and consistently apply the “coincides with” 
requirement.114 As judicial uncertainty increases the cost of capital,115 
the Court should try to create a bright line rule.  
A. Refining Dabit 
At the outset, the Court should find that SIB’s misrepresentations 
were crucial to the success of the fraud: Stanford told his brokers to 
market the CDs by emphasizing that they were highly liquid because 
they were backed by securities.116 Yet, no securities transaction took 
place (or purportedly took place) as a direct result of plaintiffs’ 
investments with SIB. The Court affirmed in Dabit that SLUSA 
requires that the misrepresentation be “in connection with” the 
purchase or sale of a security and that the fraud “coincide” with a 
securities transaction by some party. Here, the relevant 
misrepresentations made by SIB were about securities it purportedly 
already held. Thus, the issue is not whether SLUSA would preclude a 
class action by plaintiffs holding securities—Dabit makes it clear that 
it would. Rather, this case is about whether defendant’s holding of (or 
misrepresenting they held) covered securities can invoke SLUSA 
preclusion. A good rule for such cases would be that when a 
defendant makes a misrepresentation about securities it holds—not 
 
 113.  See, e.g., Newman v. Family Mgmt. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(adjudicating a class action brought against a “sub-feeder” fund that invested with Madoff’s 
“feeder funds”); Levinson v. PSCC Services, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00269 (PCD), 2009 WL 5184363, 
at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009) (considering a class action brought against a retirement fund that 
invested with Madoff). 
 114.  See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (remarking that Dabit’s 
“coincides with” requirement is “not particularly descriptive”), cert. granted sub nom. 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013); Wunderlich, supra note 6, at 210 
(noting the need for either the Court or Congress to take action to clarify SLUSA). 
 115.  See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting 
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 962 (1993) (discussing how 
uncertainty and a lack of bright line rules increases the cost of capital). 
 116.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 32. 
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securities transactions it plans or promises to make as a result of the 
plaintiff’s investment—SLUSA should not apply. 
At times, it may be difficult to determine when a defendant’s 
misrepresentations meet this standard. For example, the investors 
here believed that SIB had previously made transactions in covered 
securities (because SIB claimed to hold a portfolio of such securities) 
and probably believed SIB would eventually purchase covered 
securities in the future with proceeds from the sale of CDs. And at 
first glance this seems like a misrepresentation “in connection with” 
the purchase or sale of covered securities. The distinguishing factor 
here, however, is that an investor is unlikely to have believed that SIB 
would engage in a securities transaction as a result of that investor’s 
individual purchase of a CD. Because of this, SIB’s misrepresentations 
are more accurately characterized as concerning its holdings in 
securities, rather than its transactions in them.117 That the purported 
securities transactions occurred in the same time frame, and may have 
occurred as part of a “common scheme” as Respondents argue,118 does 
not change the fact that, from the perspective of an investor, the two 
were not connected. Thus, SLUSA is inapplicable here. 
B. Implications and Policy Considerations 
Regardless of the legal standard the Court applies, Chadbourne 
will likely have serious consequences for both issuers of securities as 
well as secondary defendants, like Chadbourne & Parke. There are 
numerous policy arguments for and against holding SLUSA 
inapplicable to SIB’s fraud, but ultimately the benefits of permitting 
state law class actions in cases such as the one at hand outweigh the 
costs. 
On the one hand, affirming the decision of the Fifth Circuit would 
likely increase the number of state law class actions filed against law 
firms and other actors who advise issuers.119 This is particularly 
 
 117.  See Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 22 (“[N]o plaintiff could have understood 
that his or her individual purchase would necessarily lead SIB to buy securities traded on a U.S. 
exchange.”). Defendants misrepresented their “general practice” to investors, but did not 
“promise to use money from any particular plaintiff to buy anything.” See id. at 30. On the other 
hand, had SIB promised to use investors’ money to purchase securities, then SIB would have 
been making misrepresentations about its transactions in securities, and SLUSA would apply. 
See, e.g., Barron v. Igolnikov, No. 09 Civ. 4471(TPG), 2010 WL 882890, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 
2010) (discussing Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, in which he told investors he would purchase covered 
securities with their investments, then sent them falsified documentation of the transactions). 
 118.  See supra Part V.A. 
 119.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of DRI—the Voice of the Defense Bar in Support of 
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problematic because class actions often seek to shift the entire cost of 
a client’s fraudulent scheme to third-party actors,120 especially when 
those directly involved in the fraud are insolvent, as is the case with 
SIB. Furthermore, liability for aiding and abetting would raise the cost 
of doing business for these third-party actors;121 this cost would be 
passed on to clients, and ultimately investors.122 
Nonetheless, these considerations are offset by the policy benefits 
of holding SLUSA inapplicable in cases such as this. First, because 
claims for aiding and abetting fraud are not permitted under § 
10(b),123 and because investors often can economically justify claims 
only through class actions, a ruling that SLUSA applies might leave 
investors without a method of aggregating claims against third-party 
defendants. This would effectively relegate investors’ claims to a legal 
“no man’s land” between federal and state law.124 Thus, to hold 
SLUSA applicable here would deny investors a state law cause of 
action in the name of furthering nationally uniform regulation,  
when no comparable federal cause of action is available. Second, the 
fraudulent representations made by SIB, which primarily involved 
CDs, are not the type targeted by national securities legislation, 
because they probably did not introduce dishonesty into national 
markets. Generally, national securities laws serve to promote investor 
confidence in two ways: by requiring certain disclosures so that 
investors have sufficient information to determine the value of a 
security,125 and by prohibiting false or misleading statements that 
would cause an investor to misjudge the value of a security.126 
 
 
Petitioners at 2, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. May 10, 
2013). 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 163–64 (2008). 
 122.  See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
189 (1994) (discussing the implications of allowing private actions for aiding and abetting 
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5). 
 123.  See id. at 190. 
 124.  See Brief of Sixteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17, 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 24, 2013). 
 125.  See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 
1897–98 (2013) (“[T]he securities acts and implementing regulations require firms to disclose 
relevant information about their financial condition, products and markets, management, and 
competitive and regulatory climate.”). 
 126.  See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 386–87 (1990) (“According to the Court, section 10(b) proscribes 
knowing and intentional misconduct designed to deceive or defraud investors.”). 
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Here, by comparison, SIB never specifically indicated the 
securities it planned to purchase or already held, nor did it make any 
false statements about the transactions themselves, other than the fact 
that they took place at all. Although such a claim is clearly fraudulent, 
it likely would not harm market integrity because it is not a 
misrepresentation that would cause investors to misevaluate the price 
of a security.127 
Thus, although holding SLUSA inapplicable and permitting state 
law class actions would potentially raise the cost of capital by third-
party actors to increased liability, this cost is offset by the need to 
provide some remedy—either at the federal or state level—to 
plaintiffs who are legitimately harmed by a third-party’s assistance in 
a fraud, especially when the defendant’s misrepresentations do not 
introduce dishonesty into national markets, as is the case here. In light 
of this, under whichever standard it adopts, the Court should hold 
SLUSA inapplicable here and permit the state law class action to 
proceed against Chadbourne & Parke. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Chadbourne gives the Court the chance to clarify Dabit and to 
address the application of SLUSA to fraudulent feeder fund 
investment schemes. Because SIB’s misrepresentations were primarily 
about its current securities holdings, and thus necessarily about 
transactions that occurred in the past, it is difficult to say that the 
misrepresentations were “in connection with” the purchase or sale of 
any securities. Thus, the Court will likely rule that SLUSA is 
inapplicable. The Court could reach this conclusion by further 
elucidating the “coincides with” standard of Dabit or by adopting the 
“not more than tangentially related to” standard used by the Fifth 
Circuit. But either approach would be ill-advised as lower courts 
would continue to struggle to interpret and consistently apply the 
indeterminate language of either standard.128 Instead, the Court 
 
 127. As a counterexample, consider if an SIB employee stated that SIB had purchased $10 
million in shares of X Corporation for its portfolio, because X Corporation was performing well 
and SIB expected the value of the shares to appreciate. If this statement was false because the 
purchase never took place and X Corporation was not expected to perform well, then this 
misrepresentation would likely have introduced dishonesty into the national securities markets. 
 128.  For the same reasons that lower courts struggled to interpret Dabit’s “coincides with” 
requirement, it is unlikely that any of the standards crafted by the circuit courts, such as the 
“more than tangentially related to” standard of Roland, would prove any easier for lower courts 
to apply consistently. See supra Part III.C.  
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should create a new standard for determining if the fraud in a feeder 
fund investment scheme was “in connection with” covered securities. 
Specifically, the Court should rule that when a defendant makes a 
misrepresentation about its holdings in securities, SLUSA does not 
apply. Under that standard, in Chadbourne the Court should find that 
SLUSA is inapplicable and thus Respondents’ state law class action is 
not precluded. 
 
